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The Puzzling Case for
Proportionate Taxation
BarbaraH. Fried*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Over the past half century, the view that the only fair tax is a
flat-rate tax has attracted support from a surprising range of
political philosophers and pundits, including Friedrich Hayek,'
Ludwig von Mises,2 Milton Friedman,3 John Rawls,4 and Richard
Epstein,5 along with Walter Blum and Harry Kalven in their famous 1952 essay.6 Notwithstanding trenchant critiques, the view
not only has persisted, but (over the past decade) has gained enormous popularity in political and academic circles. In their 1995
book, The Flat Tax, Robert Hall and Alvin Rabushka defended
their version of a flat tax with the Grimmsian pronouncement that
a flat-rate tax is "the fairest tax of all."7 In the same year, Richard
Epstein declared, "[firom the Lockean perspective, a strong case
can be made that . . . the flat tax is the only acceptable [tax]."'
Similar pronouncements can be found throughout the current
political debates, as well as more serious philosophical considerations of the just distribution of tax burdens. There is some nontrivial chance that, over the next few years, that sentiment could
carry the day in Congress.
It is, of course, impossible to evaluate these extravagant
claims on behalf of proportionality except in reference to a theory
of fairness. It goes without saying that these odd bedfellows can* Professor of Law and Deane Johnson Faculty Scholar, Stanford University. I am
grateful to Joe Bankman, David Bradford, Marvin Chirelstein, Noel Cunningham, Richard
Epstein, Tom Grey, Mark Kelman, Lewis Kornhauser, Liam Murphy, Tom Nagel, Dan
Shaviro, and Deborah Schenk for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960).
LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION (1949).
MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962).
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
RICHARD A. EpsTEn, TAKINGS (1985) [hereinafter TAKINGS]; Richard A. Epstein,
Taxation in a Lockean World, in PHILOSOPHY AND LAw 49 (Jules Coleman & Ellen Frankel
2
3
4
5

Paul eds., 1987) [hereinafter Taxation].
6 Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19
U. CHI. L. REV. 417 (1952).
7 ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX 3 (2d ed. 1995).
8 Taxation, supra note 5, at 68. See also id. at 70: "The flat tax... is an indispensable part of the Lockean program of taxation."
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not all have the same theory in mind. What follows is an attempt
to sketch out plausible intuitions of fairness on which these claims
might rest, and ask whether any of them supports it. I conclude
not.
Let me be clear what I am not arguing. I am not arguing that
some version of a flat-rate tax scheme cannot be defended as a
sensible policy solution on any other grounds, including administrative convenience, political compromise between warring considerations, or our best guess as to how to achieve a distributive end
resting on firmer philosophical grounds. Perhaps it can be so defended. I mean only to try to dislodge the apparently intractable
notion that it deserves to be adopted because it is "fair" in itself, or
because it is an obvious instantiation of some other fairness principle. I am also not arguing in favor of progressivity, regressivity,
or any other rate structure on fairness grounds. The deeper moral
is that no sensible theory of distributive justice would fix on rate
structures themselves as fair or unfair. Rate structures are just a
means to operationalize other prior, moral commitments about
the proper role of government. The case for any particular rate
structure must stand or fall on how well it realizes those prior
commitments. An examination of plausible, prior moral commitments, however, suggests that, of all possible rate structures, proportionality may be the hardest to derive from any coherent
theory of fairness.
In the first part of the paper, I consider the case for proportionate taxation in the context of two broad views of governmental
power in fiscal matters. The first, an essentially libertarian view
of the state, takes the proper role of government to be limited to
solving the collective action problems that prevent private actors
from spontaneously reaching optimal outcomes through voluntary
agreements. While tolerating whatever minimal redistribution
might occur as a consequence of solving collective action problems,
the libertarian view generally rules out income redistribution as a
motive for state action. One recent proponent of that view has
located that prohibition in the Constitution, through an expansive
interpretation of the Takings Clause.9 Most have simply deduced
it from natural law principles. 10 In tax theory, the clear corollary
to libertarianism is the so-called "benefits" theory of taxation. I
start with libertarianism, because it is the premise from which
most of those who advocate flat-rate taxes on fairness grounds
seem to be starting.
The second, a social welfarist view of the state, accepts that
income redistribution for the express purpose of improving the
9 See TAKINGS, supra note 5, at 99-100, 295-303.
10 See, e.g., HAYEK, supra note 1, at 315-18; Taxation, supra note 5.
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welfare of the less well-off in society is a legitimate part of the
state's job, although there is obviously much disagreement about
the optimal extent and form of redistribution. While there are no
clear corollaries to the social welfarist view of the state in tax theory-something that I think is not coincidental-"ability to pay"
and "minimum sacrifice" arguments undoubtedly reflect that view
in inchoate form.
Other views of the legitimate role of the state in fiscal affairs
are, of course, possible, but most that are offered in tax debates,
when pushed hard enough, end up being some version of one of
these two views.
Both of the foregoing views evaluate taxation in the context of
a comprehensive system of government (re)distribution. In the
last part of the paper, I take up a number of defenses of a flat-rate
tax viewed in isolation from the uses to which tax revenues are
put. These include the widespread view that a flat-rate tax vindicates some important notion of equality; that it leaves individuals' choices among various activities undistorted; and that it
limits the (unfair) expropriation of the wealthiest classes by the
majority. Finally, I consider two other positive explanations for
the popular convergence on proportionate taxation. The first is
that its apparent properties of mathematical simplicity and certainty have made it a Schelling-like focal point solution to the
problem of appropriate tax rates. The second is that its popularity, particularly among libertarians, is a product of political framing-of the fact that, at least in recent history, no one would have
considered a regressive rate structure for our broad-based income
tax to be a politically viable alternative. Were that fact to change,
it seems quite likely that many who support proportionate taxation on libertarian grounds would find regressivity, on reconsideration, a more plausible expression of libertarian ideals.
II.

LIBERTARIAN (BENEFITS) THEORY

In contemporary debate, the most vociferous advocates of a
flat-rate tax-Friedman," Hayek, 2 Epstein, 3 and Gauthier, 4 to
name some prominent examples-have been animated by liberta-

11 See supra note 3.
12
13

See supra note 1.
See supra note 5.

14 DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS

By

AGREEMENT

(1986).
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rian impulses. 15 The same is true of earlier defenders. 6 In such a
view, the just limits of state power derive from an essentially
Hobbesian and Lockean social contractarian view of the state, in
which the state exists solely to provide services that, for a variety
of reasons of market failure, cannot be provided optimally by private, voluntary agreement. As has been noted, that view implies
a quid pro quo relationship between the taxpayer and the state, in
which taxes function as the shadow price for goods or services that
the state provides. 7 Hayek provided the classic argument for deriving proportionate rates from a benefits theory of taxation: "a
person who commands more of the resources of society will also
gain proportionately more from what the government has contributed" to the provision of those resources, and taxation ought to be
levied in proportion to the benefits so provided.'"
The first big problem in assessing the case for proportionate
taxation under a social contractarian view of the state is that almost none of the proponents of proportionality on (vaguely) libertarian grounds, from Adam Smith on down, have in fact supported
proportionate taxation. A true flat-rate tax would tax all income
(or consumption, as the case may be) starting with the first dollar,
15 For other, recent expositions of a social contractarian justification for a flat tax, see
James A. Dorn, Introduction: The Principles and Politics of Tax Reform, 5 CATO J. 361
(1985); Richard E. Wagner, Normative and Positive Foundationsof Tax Reform, 5 CATO J.
385 (1985). A number of other libertarians, while not explicitly defending proportionate
taxation, limit their attacks on redistributive ("discriminatory") taxation to progressivity,
thereby, at least by implication, treating proportionate taxation as nondiscriminatory, and
hence fair. See, e.g., VON MIsEs, supra note 2, at 803-05, 851-54; HARVEY Lurz, GUIDEPOSTS
TO A FREE ECONOMY 73-82 (1945).
16 For a summary of the proponents of proportionate taxation through the early part
of the 20th century, see EDWIN R. SELIGMAN, PROGRESSIVE TAXATION IN THEORY AND PRAcTICE 148-84 (1908). Notable early proponents included Hobbes, Locke and (somewhat more
ambiguously) Adam Smith. For Smith's famous support of proportionate taxation on fair-

ness grounds, see

ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH

945 (Regnery 1998). For the contrary impulse, in the context of a tax on house
rents, see id. at 966, arguingthat "[iut is not very unreasonable that the rich should contribute to the public expence, not only in proportion to their revenue, but something more
than in that proportion."
17 See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 62 (1959).
18 HAYEK, supra note 1, at 316. For similar statements, see Taxation, supra note 5, at
74; FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 175; ANTONIO DE VITI DE MARCO, FIRST PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC FINANCE (Edith Paolo Marget trans., 1936), cited in MUSGRAVE, supra note 17, at 72-73;
SMITH, supra note 16, at 945. Among proponents of a flat-rate tax on (vaguely) libertarian
grounds, Blum and Kalven strongly dissent from a "benefits taxation" justification for flat
rates, on both empirical and normative grounds. They conclude, as an empirical matter,
that the distribution of benefits among income classes is so indeterminate that it is pointless to defend either progressivity or proportionality on these grounds. If forced to guess,
they would guess that all citizens benefit approximately alike, leading to a head tax rather
than a fiat tax. Blum & Kalven, supra note 6, at 455. On normative grounds, they adopt
the view of Mill that "to assert that individuals receive significantly different benefits from
living in a particular society is in effect to assert that there is something seriously wrong
with that society." Id. The latter objection seems silly, if it refers to unequal levels of utility
derived from government-provided services (why should everyone value all government
services the same?), as opposed to unequal access to those services.
OF NATIONS
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at the same rate. Instead, they have supported a so-called degressive version of a progressive tax, in which the first x dollars of
income or consumption, sufficient to cover basic needs, is taxed at
a zero rate, and all income or consumption above that is taxed at
the same positive rate. 9
The political advantages of a degressive tax over a proportionate tax are obvious, and hardly lost on its supporters. 0 There is
little public support for a true proportionate tax that contains no
exemption for basic income. It is hard to overstate, however, the
difficulties that that concession entails for those whose opposition
to any greater degree of progressivity via a graduated rate structure is based on the fact that such progressivity is motivated by
purely redistributive concerns. If all of us earning income above
the exemption level have an obligation to pick up the tab for government services provided to the poor, simply because they are
poor and we are not, why stop there? Why not tax the rich for
government services at an even higher rate than the middle class,
simply because the rich have more money than everyone else and
hence can better afford to defray the cost? Or, for that matter,
why not raise the exemption level to, say, $30,000 for a family of
four, raise the flat rate tax from, say, 19% to 25%, and use the
2
excess proceeds to finance a guaranteed minimum income to all? '
At that point, "proportionate" taxation would start looking mighty
attractive to the sorts of welfare state liberals who would reject
the libertarian premises of benefits taxation out of hand. Surely
Frank Taussig was right in declaring many years ago that "[t]he
demand for the exemption of the lowest tier of incomes results
from the same state of mind as the advocacy of progressive taxai Under the Hall/Rabushka version of a flat tax, for example, exemption amounts
range from $9500 for a single person to $25,500 for a family of four; amounts in excess of
that are taxed at a 19% rate. HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 7, at 144.
20 For Blum and Kalven's astonishingly bare concession to exemptions, see Blum &
Kalven, supra note 6, at 420: "It is almost unanimously agreed that some exemption keyed
to at least a minimum subsistence standard of living is desirable. Since such an exemption
will necessarily result in some degree of progression among taxpayers above the exemption
level, and since this degree of progression appears inescapable, the real issue is whether
any added degree of progression can be justified." See also 2 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW,
LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY

87 (1976), endorsing in a slightly different context a uniform

minimum income "to all those who, for any reason, are unable to earn in the market an
adequate maintenance"; SMrrH, supra note 16, at 992-94 (opposing taxes on the wages of
laborers), 999-1003 (opposing taxes on "necessaries").
21 For a proposal along these lines, see Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social
Welfare and the Rate Structure:A New Look at ProgressiveTaxation, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1905,
1950-55 (1987). Those who oppose progressivity via graduated rates, but support progressivity of a degressive sort, have long seen the potential for the latter to approach the results
of the former if exemption levels get high enough. See, e.g., Blum & Kalven, supra note 6,
at 513. They have erroneously assumed, however, that the two could not converge, because
they have ignored the government's redistributive arsenals on the transfer side. See id.
See also infra note 69.
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tion [through graduated rates]."22 If there is some principled basis
for absorbing redistributive motives into benefits theory to the extent of basic needs, but no further,libertarians have yet to articulate it. 23 Until such time as they do, those few hearty libertarians
who have rejected an exemption for basic income as inconsistent
with conventional libertarianism seem to have the better of their
libertarian fellow travellers, and are to be commended, from the
point of view of principle, at least, for sticking to their libertarian
guns here.2 4
For the balance of the discussion, I set that difficulty aside, to
turn to the central question. If, as benefits theorists argue, taxes
ought to function as the shadow price for goods or services that the
state provides, how do we set that price? The logical place to begin
is with a determination of what a well-functioning private market
would have charged for those goods or services. As Musgrave
stated many years ago, "[slince the relation is one of exchange, the
rules of the public household are taken to be more or less the same
as those of the market."25 What then are the rules of the (private)
market-or more precisely, which of the rules of the private market do we think ought to be transported to the public household,
and once transported, what do those rules imply about appropriate tax rates?
The uncontroversial starting point for analyzing the fairness
of the market is the requirement of strict paretianism: the re22 FRANK TAUSsIG, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS

499 (1911), quoted in Blum & Kalven,

supra note 6, at 509 n.229.
23 The familiar argument along these lines, going back at least to Adam Smith, is that
there is no point in taxing the poor, because (1) we can't get blood from stone, and/or (2) we
will only end up supporting the poor anyway through some kind of welfare system. The
second argument misses the boat entirely, since it assumes an obligation to support the
poor through affirmative transfers-an obligation that most true libertarians would reject.
The first argument has some force, but does not explain our failure to exclude the "deadbeat" poor from those public benefits that are not true public goods, and hence from which
exclusion is possible, such as public schools and health care.
Hayek has sought to distinguish a degressive version of a progressive tax from a graduated rate version, on the ground that the former constitutes "a majority's taxing itself to
assist a minority," while the latter constitutes the much more egregious decision of a "majority [to] impos[e] upon a minority whatever burden it regards as right." HAYEK, supra
note 1, at 314. For similar sentiments, see sources quoted in Blum & Kalven, supra note 7,
at 435. I take up this political process argument in another context below. See notes 98101, infra, and accompanying text. For now, I note only that the argument responds to
those, like Hayek, who are most concerned with class warfare qua classes, and is not an
adequate response to the more conventional concerns of libertarians that the rich are entitled to be protected from expropriation not only by the poor, but also by their fellow, more
beneficent rich, on behalf of the poor.
24 See, for example, TAKINGS, supra note 5, at 297, supporting a tax that takes "a
constant percentage of net income . . . from the first dollar of net income to the last." See
also ROBERT NozICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 169 (1974) (equating taxation of wages

with forced labor); Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Tax Fairnessor Unfairness?A Considerationof
the PhilosophicalBases for Unequal Taxation of Individuals, 12 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 221, 270-

71 (1995) (advocating a head tax as the only fair tax).
25 MUSGRAVE, supra note 17, at 62.
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quirement that every trade leave no side worse off, and at least
one side better off. This requirement is assumed to be met automatically by any voluntary market transaction. Strict paretianism, however, is a minimally exacting standard, which gives little
guidance in resolving the central problems in assigning the tax
costs of providing public benefits.
First, the pareto principle provides no guidance on the level of
aggregation at which the "betteroffness" from being in society is to
be judged. If the level of aggregation is great enough-at the extreme, for example, if we test the pareto superiority of the benefits/taxation deal each American is offered at the level of the
decision whether to exit this society or not-then there is almost
no redistributive mischief that cannot be justified. At the other
extreme, if we insist that each government program satisfy strict
paretianism, then almost no program can be justified, since there
will always be individuals under any feasible tax scheme who are
paying more for a particular public good, such as a road through
the middle of Kansas, than the benefit they derive from it.
In practice, libertarian benefits theorists seem to employ a
mixed criterion, along the following lines. First, strict paretianism is used to judge the aggregate deal each of us has gotten from
being in society rather than out of it. 26 This standard will almost
always be met if we are comparing any plausible configuration of
tax burdens in America circa 1999 to our likely individual positions in some hypothetical Crusoeian state of nature, and, indeed,
is met automatically as long as there is a meaningful opportunity
for exit from society. Second, a potential pareto (that is, KaldorHicks) test is used to judge expenditures at the maximally disaggregated level. Thus, each particular road through Kansas must
be justified by showing that the social gains from building it outweigh the social costs entailed. However, one need not show that
each citizen derives benefits from that particular road at least
equal to her share of the social costs of building it. 27 Finally, strict
26 See, e.g., Taxation, supra note 5, at 53. Both Nozick's "liability rule" compensation
scheme for private protective agencies banished by the ultraminimal state, and his justification of private appropriation out of the commons whenever nonowners are better off with
a private property regime than they would be in a state of nature, rely on strict pareto
compensation for rights lost in the creation of the Lockean state. See NozIcK, supra note
24, at 78-84, 174-77. For a similar argument justifying private appropriation of the commons with a liability rule of compensation, see GAUTHIER, supra note 14, at 291-92.
27 Epstein's position on this question is unclear, or at least inconsistent. He invokes
strict paretianism at the individual program level to bar "the redistribution of income
through the tax system." Taxation, supra note 5, at 68. At some points, he appears to
revert implicitly to a Kaldor-Hicks criterion to judge the acceptability of the remaining
programs. TAKINGS, supra note 5, at 201. At others, however, he suggests he will require
strict paretianism for every government program. (See Taxation, supra note 5, at 55-56,
arguing that the system should "tr[y] to insure that every public expenditure is worth more
to every party taxed than the revenues that are lost."). See also RIcHARD EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE, 82-86 (1993). For a similar insistence on strict paretianism at the
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paretianism is used to test the tax/benefits deal over some representative class of incremental public goods being considered. That
is to say, in a just state, over a representative period, each individual in the state will derive benefits from government services that
are at least equal to the cost she bears for them. This formulation
is just a guess, however, since most proponents of a benefits theory of taxation are unclear or inconsistent on the point.
Second, the pareto principle requires only that tax prices be
set so that no one is made worse off by the compulsory purchase of
public goods. It says nothing about the proper distribution of surplus above that-that is, about distribution of the gains from
trade.
In private competitive markets, both of these problems-the
level of aggregation on which to test pareto improvements and the
just division of gains from trade-are automatically resolved
through equilibrium prices. When dealing with public goods, they
are not. Since in the latter case we are dealing with hypothetical
and not actual markets, and moreover hypothetical markets in
which the government operates as a monopoly supplier who can
compel payment at dictated prices, we have enormous theoretical
latitude in constructing the hypothetical exchange between government as supplier and citizens as consumers. In particular, we
have enormous latitude in resolving the two questions above: the
level of aggregation at which to bundle goods or services in judging the pareto fairness of our tax scheme, and the just division of
surplus value. Depending upon the resolution of both these questions, there is an enormous range of acceptable distributions of tax
burdens to finance public goods, within the constraints of
paretianism.
At one extreme, imagine the state as monopolist with perfect
information about people's reservation prices for public goods, and
hence the ability to perfectly price discriminate in setting tax
prices for those goods. Consistent with the pareto principle, the
state could tax each person in society at a rate that appropriates
100% of the surplus value of public goods. On a broad view of public goods or benefits that should be counted in setting tax rates,
including not merely traditional public goods or services, but all
the benefits of being in our organized society rather than on a
Crusoeian island or in war-torn Rwanda, this broad power to expropriate surplus value would authorize something close to a confiscatory tax on almost everyone.
level of every individual program ("interaction"), see GAUTHIER, supra note 14, at 258.
Given that no government expenditure could pass this test, it seems unlikely that either of
the foregoing authors really means to require it.
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At the other extreme, suppose that the benefits that can be
counted are limited to identifiable costly goods or services provided by government, and suppose further that the government
must act as a supplier in a private competitive market would act;
that is, it is compelled to charge a uniform per unit price for all
goods consumed. The most likely outcome of benefits theory on
those suppositions is a highly regressive tax.
For the balance of the discussion, I will focus on the second
question: how prices for public goods should be set, within the constraints of strict paretianism, and hence how the surplus value
generated by public goods should be divided. As the discussion
that follows makes clear, neither the libertarian literature approaching the benefits question from the perspective of distributive justice, nor the public economics literature approaching it
from the perspective of allocative efficiency, gives a determinate
answer to that question.
A.

The Lessons of the Private Market

There is a fatal ambiguity running through the benefits theory literature about how benefits ought to be measured. This ambiguity is reflected in Hayek's statement that "a person who
commands more of the resources of society will also gain proportionately more from what the government has contributed" to the
provision of those resources. 2 s Does Hayek mean by "gain . . .
more" that the rich consume a proportionately greater quantity of
public goods, or that the rich derive proportionately greater utility
from public goods?
Taking the private competitive market as the benchmark, one
is pushed to the former interpretation. In a purely competitive
market, all consumers face the same per unit price, set by the
equilibrium price for the good. Suppliers cannot price-discriminate based on consumers' different reservation prices for the
goods, because any effort to set a higher price for any consumer
will be undercut by another supplier. As a consequence, the relative prices that consumers pay for a given good depend solely on
the relative quantities of the good they consume. Whatever consumer or producer surplus is generated by trades at that price lies
where it happens to fall. Assuming a conventional downwardsloping demand curve and an upward-sloping supply curve, equilibrium prices, reflecting the marginal utility or cost of the last
unit consumed, will leave each consumer or producer with surplus
from all but the last unit consumed or sold. The precise amount of
the surplus depends on the fortuitous shape of individual and aggregate demand and supply curves.
28 HAYEK, supra note 1, at 316 (emphasis added).
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Under this interpretation, benefits theory leads to proportionate taxation if and only if the quantity of public goods that people
consume is proportionate to income. As even proponents of a proportionate tax concede, this premise is highly implausible. 29 The
premise is doubtful for many public goods, such as roads, fire protection, and garbage collection. It is clearly wrong for others, including true public goods (for example, clean air, defense, and
broadcast spectra), one of the defining characteristics of which is
that they are jointly consumed, with the result that everyone consumes the same quantity (or has the same quantity available for
consumption). In the end, such a measure of benefits is much
more likely to lead to a highly regressive tax.
If, on the other hand, what Hayek and others mean by "gains
more" is that people ought to be taxed in proportion to the utility
that they derive from public goods, the implications for appropriate tax rates are much less clear. Indeed, the question is probably
completely unresolvable, both because of the impossibility of measuring the relative utility levels each income class derives from
public goods, and because of conceptual problems in deciding what
one ought to be measuring. If, for example, Bill Gates's immense
wellbeing is a joint product of publicly provided goods and a host
of other factors such as social opportunities, talents, and hard
work, and each of these factors is a but-for cause of his wellbeing,
then how much of his wellbeing gets credited to publicly provided
goods, and how much to other sources?
The choice between these two interpretations of "gains more"
boils down to the question of what is so great about market-based
distribution, beyond its guarantee of strict paretianism. In particular, is there any normative reason to preserve (or mimic) the
haphazard distribution of gains from trade that happens to result
from uniform, equilibrium pricing in competitive markets, when
we move from the private market to the shadow market for public
goods? Here, we encounter a wide range of views from the libertarian camp that don't lead to any obvious conclusion.
Most libertarians treat as sacrosanct the division of surplus
that happens to result from market prices, with exceptions often
made for privately appropriated, scarce natural resources and
other monopoly goods. There is little agreement among libertarians, however, as to why market prices are sacrosanct.3" Moreover,
29

A "not clearly inappropriate assumption" is the best that Milton Friedman can do.

FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 175.
30 Some libertarians, such as

Nozick and Hayek, appear to regard market prices as
sacrosanct not because such prices effect a just division of the surplus, but because they are
a necessary byproduct of freedoms independently worth protecting. In Nozick's case, the
relevant freedom is the freedom of the buyer to give away her money to whomsoever she
wishes. See Barbara Fried, Wilt ChamberlainRevisited: Nozick's "Justicein Transfer"and
the Problem of Market-Based Distribution,24 PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 226, 233
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many of the arguments offered for not disrupting the actual, haphazard assignment of surplus in a well-functioning competitive
market do not translate well to public goods. Still others have explicitly treated some or all of the gains from trade, or rents, as
morally up for grabs. Among contemporary libertarians, David
Gauthier is a leading exponent of that view.3 1 Hobbes was as well,
maintaining in effect that all individual gains from moving from a
Hobbesian state of nature to civilization are expropriable by an
all-powerful sovereign. If we are to read Hayek's statement above
in the second way, to mean that it is permissible to tax people in
accordance with the utility they derive from public goods rather
than the quantity they consume, then he, and all others who subscribe to that view, ought to be counted in the Hobbesian camp as
well.
When dealing with private, competitive markets, most defenders of the free market would argue that it is unnecessary to
resolve these internecine disagreements about the justice of market-based distribution. However morally arbitrary the market's
division of gains from trade might be, the efficiency costs of the
government's trying to alter it through price regulation or other
means are simply too great to justify the effort. As one commentator has stated: "[how the gains from trade are distributed [by the
market] is determined arbitrarily, but since this distributional issue is resolved as a by-product of a process benefitting all parties,
it need not become a bone of contention."3 2 When dealing with
publicly provided goods, however, that response is not available.
The government must set shadow prices in the first instance. As a
monopoly supplier with the power to coerce payment through taxn.20 (1995). In the case of Hayek, it is the freedom of the seller of goods or services to "use
his knowledge for his own purposes." HAYEK, supra note 20, at 69.
Others have defended market-based distribution as just in itself, because it rewards all
individuals in accordance with their marginal product-that is, with the value they have
bestowed on others. For a discussion of John Bates Clark, a prime expositor of this view,
and his critics, see BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSWVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAmiE 131-45
(1998).
31 Gauthier's position on rents is at least confusing, if not confused. At one point, he
defines the rents that are up for grabs to include any excess paid to a factor of production
over the next best price offered-a measure that would confiscate the incremental scarcity
rents paid in moving from the second best to best offer, but not those inherent in the second
best offer. GAUTHIER, supra note 14, at 272-73. At other times, he argues that everyone is
entitled to, and only to, their marginal product in a competitive market with no negative
externalities-a measure that would confiscate all scarcity rents in noncompetitive markets but not inframarginal rents in competitive markets. Id. at 90, 91-92, 95-98. Still elsewhere, however, he suggests that everyone is entitled only to the "full cost of supply for the
factor services she provides-a standard, equivalent to reservation price, that would eliminate a right to inframarginal rents as well. Id. at 97-98. Without some clearer view of why
Gauthier believes that any portion of the market return is sacrosanct, it is difficult to
choose among these conflicting measures. The reasons Gauthier suggests, however-some
combination of optimization and a desire not to distort choices among activities on libertarian grounds (see id. at 93-94)-push towards the last view.
32 DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 37-38 (1989).
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ation, it could price-discriminate if it wished to, without being undercut by competitors. Finally, unlike in the competitive market,
price discrimination may well be dictated by efficiency considerations, at least in the case of true public goods. I turn to the last
point now.
B.

Pricing True Public Goods

A true public good is one that exhibits two characteristics. It
is jointly consumed, and exhibits nonexcludibility, meaning that it
is either technologically infeasible to exclude people from use (the
case, for example, with clean air or defense), or inefficient to do so
because the incremental cost of not excluding is very low or zero,
and/or the cost of monitoring use in order to exclude very high,
such as with roads or TV airwaves. Because of the problem of
nonexcludibility, a private market cannot provide such goods.
From a libertarian point of view, true public goods are the only
goods that ought to be publicly supplied; that is, the sole justification for coercive government is to correct market failure that
would preclude optimal coordination in the absence of coercion.
How such goods would or should be priced in the absence of a functioning market is therefore a critical question for any benefits theorist, and a notoriously difficult one.
An extensive literature in public economics over the past 80
years has been devoted to devising a theoretical solution to the
problem of optimal output and optimal pricing of true public
goods. Since the literature is almost exclusively concerned with
efficiency questions-that is, how to determine the optimal output
of public goods from an efficiency point of view-in one sense it is
all beside the point here. In a couple of other senses, however, it is
not. First, the implicit or explicit indifference of the public economics literature in this area to the distributional consequences of
optimal pricing schemes undercuts any claim that there is some
broadly compelling view about the just distribution of surplus.
Second, many of the optimal pricing solutions proposed on efficiency grounds have determinate distributive outcomes that are
hard to square with anything resembling a proportionate tax
scheme. That means, at the very least, that benefits theorists who
are drawn to proportionality on fairness grounds may have to be
willing to pay a theoretical price on efficiency grounds.
1.

LindahllBowen/Samuelson Solutions

The central problem in determining optimal output of true
public goods derives from the problem of nonexcludibility: because we cannot exclude anyone from using true public goods, we
cannot rely on a decentralized price system automatically to re-
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veal true demand for the goods. 3 Eighty years ago, Erik Lindahl
proposed a theoretical solution to this problem, subsequently reworked in a general equilibrium framework by Paul Samuelson.
His solution remains the starting point for any analysis of public
goods .
The mechanics of Lindahl-type solutions are somewhat complicated, but the basic intuition behind them can be stated simply.
To achieve an efficient allocation of all resources, we want every
consumer to equate her marginal rate of substitution between all
commodities, whether privately or publicly supplied. In a competitive market, where everyone faces the same price for goods, that
equilibrium is reached by each consumer varying the quantity of
each good she purchases until the marginal utility of each good
equals its set price. In true public goods, where everyone must
consume, or have available for consumption, the same quantity of
the good, that equilibrium is reached by varying the price each
consumer pays for the good, until the price equals the marginal
utility she derives from that set quantity of the public good.
The hypothetical mechanics for reaching a Lindahl equilibrium quantity and price are as follows. Each citizen, in effect, submits bids, revealing the marginal price she would be willing to pay
for a given public good at each plausible quantity of that good.3 5 A
combined social demand curve for that good is created by adding
up the marginal unit price bids from all citizens at each quantity
level.3 6 The optimal level of supply is the equilibrium point where
the combined demand curve, equal to the combined marginal
prices for a given quantity of goods, intersects with the supply
schedule for that good, equal to marginal cost of production.
Once the equilibrium quantity is determined, each citizen is
assigned a tax share to pay for the cost of the goods. That tax
share is equal to the marginal price she bid at what turned out to
33 For a classic statement of problem, see Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387, 389 (1954), reprinted in KENNETH J. ARROW &
TIBOR SCITOVSKY, READINGS IN WELFARE ECONOMICS 179, 182 (1969). See also MUELLER,
supra note 32, at 123.
34 For an overview of Lindahl's solution and the variants on it proposed by Bowen and
others, see MUELLER, supra note 32, at 43-50; ANTHONY B. ATKINSON & JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ,
LECTURES ON PUBLIC ECONOMICS 487-89 (1980); and MUSGRAVE, supra note 17, at 74-80.
For Samuelson's general equilibrium version of the Lindahl solution, see Samuelson,
supra note 33.
35 The marginal price at any given quantity represents the marginal utility of the last
unit of that good at that quantity. In Lindahl's formulation, the bids reflect the percentage
of the cost at any specified quantity that each individual is willing to pay. In Bowen's
formulation, the bids reflect the absolute dollars at a specified quantity that each individual is willing to pay.
36 Thus, while in private goods contexts we add up demand horizontally to ascertain
the total quantity demanded at a given price, in public goods contexts we add up demand
vertically to ascertain the total amount that all individuals are willing to pay for a given
quantity of public goods. This difference simply reflects the difference in what we take as
given in the two contexts-price v. quantity.
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be the equilibrium quantity, times that equilibrium quantity. The
result is a set of personalized prices, such that, at those specified
prices, everyone demands the same level of each public good.
What are the distributive effects of Lindahl tax shares? They
mimic the effects of the competitive market in one respect: they
divide the inframarginal surplus from public goods in a haphazard
fashion. Each citizen's Lindahl tax price for a public good reflects
the utility of the marginal unit value of that good at equilibrium
output, times the total agreed-upon output. Assuming a downward sloping demand curve, each citizen will therefore realize inframarginal surplus, i.e. gains from trade, on all but the last unit
consumed. As in competitive markets, however, the amount of
that surplus is arbitrarily fixed by the shape of the individual's
demand curve for that good relative to the equilibrium price." In
another respect, however, Lindahl tax prices differ from conventional prices in a competitive market: Lindahl tax prices are proportionate to the marginal utility each individual derives from a
given quantity of a public good, rather than to the quantity of that
good consumed. In contrast, in the competitive market, total
prices spent on a good would be proportionate to quantity consumed, since, facing a constant price, consumers vary their quantity until the last unit purchased generates marginal utility equal
to that price.
Just as it is unclear what Hayek's "total utility" metric for tax
shares may imply about tax rates, it is also unclear what Lindahl's "marginal utility" metric for tax shares implies about tax
rates. For some true public goods, marginal utility seems unlikely
to be positively correlated with income, suggesting a highly regressive tax rate. For others, it might be positively correlated
with income, but whether that measure would lead to proportionality seems much more doubtful.
2.

Demand-Revealing Price Structures

As numerous commentators have noted, Lindahl-type solutions, which tie the ultimate tax shares to stated preferences, all
have a central flaw. Since the government cannot exclude individ37 See ATKINSON & STIGLITZ, supra note 34, at 509-12. The solution parallels the optimal solution for pricing jointly produced products, where the shared fixed costs of production are allocated between the products in proportion not to their respective variable costs,
but in proportion to respective demand. In the public goods context, rather than facing two
products with shared fixed costs, we face one product with shared benefits. The solution is
the same, however: the costs of the product are allocated among consumers who share the
benefits in proportion to their demand schedule for the product.
38 See T. Nicolaus Tideman, EthicalFoundationsof the Demand-RevealingProcess, 29
PUBLic CHOICE 71, 74 (1977) ("if cost shares exactly equalled benefit shares ...
redistribution would be confined to that induced by the relatively arbitrary sharing of gains from
trade under Lindahl taxes").
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uals from using true public goods, whatever their stated preferences, such solutions-which, in effect, require each individual
bidder to put her money where her mouth is-create an incentive
for individuals to understate their preferences in the bidding process, thereby leading to the suboptimal production of public
goods.3"
Over the past 35 years, a number of public economists have
proposed ingenious modifications to Lindah's basic scheme to
solve this central problem.4' The modifications take different
forms, but most share one key feature: the tax share that people
ultimately will pay for each public good is decoupled from their
stated preferences for that good, in order to induce true revelation
of preferences. In most models, that result is accomplished by a
two-level pricing system: (1) a first-level tax is imposed to cover
the full costs of producing a public good at a given level, with the
tax shares assigned independent of each person's true demand
schedule for that good; and (2) a supplementary tax is imposed,
the sole purpose of which is to force the true revelation of preferences. This latter tax is not used to pay for the public good in
question.4 ' The level of this supplementary tax in most schemes is
loosely correlated with preferences, since it may, and in some
cases certainly will, impose some cost on each individual to move
the outcome in her preferred direction.4 2 To that extent, the supplementary tax may reflect a loose quid pro quo for benefits received. The correlation, however, is loose at best. In the case of
the leading schemes, once a large number of voters is introduced,
the tax disappears entirely.
What does the foregoing imply about the appropriate tax
rates to finance true public goods? The critical feature of all of
these proposals is that each individual's tax share must be unrelated to that individual's revealed demand for the good, and hence
the level of utility she derives from consumption. This requirement rules out, at least in strict form, the one criterion for assigning tax shares, quid pro quo on an individual basis, that a
benefit theory insists upon. Many of these schemes contemplate
that the first-level tax will be apportioned among individuals on a
39 See MUSGRAVE, supra note 17, at 80; Samuelson, supra note 33, at 888-89, 182: "it
is in the selfish interest of each person to give false signals, to pretend to have less interest
in a given collective consumption activity than he really has." For a summary of the other
reasons to anticipate that Lindahl's strategy would not achieve an optimal solution, see
MUSGRAVE, supra note 17, at 79.
40 Most of these demand-revealing solutions are traceable back to Theodore Groves,
Incentives in Teams, 41 ECONOMETRMCA 617 (1973).
41 In some models, the supplementary tax is not paid in dollars at all, but instead in
scarce voting points; in others, it is paid in dollars, but the dollars are wasted, or at least
not returned in any systematic fashion to the individual voters (if they were, that would
undermine motives for honest revelation).
42 See MUELLER, supra note 32, at 145.
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per capita basis, a solution that would obviously be highly regressive. For some schemes, the per capita charge is a necessary feature, while for others, it is not. In the latter cases, it is
theoretically possible that, once optimal output, and hence full
costs, are determined, one could distribute that tax burden by income class or other measurable and taxable voter characteristics
in a fashion that approximates what Lindahl taxes for that group
would look like.4 3 That decision, however, is independent of the
efficiency concerns that are driving the models, and would be dictated by wholly external distributive concerns, which require independent justification.
C.

Epstein's "Tale of Two Pies"

These and all other attempts to solve the problem of optimal
output and pricing in the true public goods context are concerned
only with efficiency. Thus, they take the background distribution
of wealth as just, and disregard whatever incidental distributive
effects their solution might entail. In recent years, some prominent libertarians have directly addressed the question of the just
distribution of surplus from public goods and the tax costs of financing them. Two notable recent examples are Richard Epstein's Takings" and David Gauthier's Morals by Agreement.
Both arguments attempt to develop a theory of the just distribution of surplus value created by the existence of an organized society, and both purport to derive proportionate taxation from that
theory. Many of the intuitions that drive these two pieces seem to
be widely shared in libertarian defenses of proportionate taxation,
including Hayek's quoted above.4 5
I have explored both arguments in greater length elsewhere.46
In the interests of economy, I will limit discussion here to Ep43 For such a suggestion, see Tideman, supra note 38, at 74. The logic here is that,
while taxpayers might still have a mild incentive to depress their income levels to avoid
Lindahl taxes, they have no incentive to lie about their true preferences, since their individual, truthful revelation has virtually no effect on aggregate output, and hence on the
absolute amount of the Lindahl share their income class will bear.
44 Epstein's arguments in TAKINGS (supra note 5) are prefigured in an earlier piece,
Taxation in a Lockean World (supranote 5).
45 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
46 Barbara Fried, Why Do Libertarians Love Proportionate Taxation? Epstein's Tale
of Two Pies and Other Puzzles (draft manuscript) (copy on file with Chapman Law Review).
Gauthier's convoluted theory of just distribution is not easy to summarize. In brief, he
argues that the surplus value from society ought to be divided among all the cooperators
who produced it in accordance with his principle of "minimax relative concession" (MRC).
MRC requires that surplus be divided among members of a society so as to equate the ratio
of (1) the total amount of surplus that each person actually gets from any cooperative ven-

ture in which he is a participant, to (2) the largest amount of surplus he could have plausibly claimed from that cooperative venture. Gauthier's verbal formulation is different, but
amounts mathematically to the same thing. GAUTHIER, supra note 14, at 136-40. The largest amount he could have plausibly claimed, in turn, is the amount left over after fellow
cooperators' costs are covered; that is, after cooperators are left no worse off than under
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stein's, the more conventional of the two. Epstein, consistent with
conventional libertarian premises, limits the state's taxing powers
to raising funds to finance true public goods, explicitly precluding
any spending motivated by redistributive intent. 47 That constraint, however, leaves open the question of how precisely that
revenue is to be raised, and hence how any surplus value generated by the existence of the minimal state-with surplus implicitly defined here as the total value of society net of the tax costs of
providing it-is to be distributed among citizens.
For Epstein, all roads, whether constitutional, Lockean rights
theory or utilitarian, lead to the same two-part answer to the
question, "'Who gets the surplus?" 48 First, the surplus should be

divided in proportion to the value of each citizen's "private holdings," which Epstein defines as the property she would have held
in a state of nature (SON), under just (Lockean) principles of acquisition.49 Second, such proportional division of surplus will naturally, if not definitionally, lead to proportionate taxation.
Both halves of the argument have some surface plausibility.
At least so one is led to conclude by the long list of people who
have subscribed to them. The more one ponders them, however,
the less plausible they seem. I take up each half in turn.
1. Why Should the Surplus Value Created by the
Existence of Organized Society Be Distributed in
Proportion to the Value of Rights Individuals
Have Brought into Society?
As noted above, Epstein purports to defend this proposition
from three different vantage points: constitutionalism, utilitarianism, and a Lockean, natural rights, perspective. For present purposes, I want to set the first two to the side, and examine the
noncooperation. Id. at 137-39. As Gauthier ultimately acknowledges, this formula dictates
an equal division of surplus among all participants in each cooperative venture, assuming
each makes the largest plausible claim he could. Id. at 151-54, 277. In Gauthier's view,
this equal division may be deviated from, under a Rawlsian minimax principle, where all
will be benefitted by the deviation. What it implies about the division of surplus at the
societal level is much less clear. Gauthier argues that it logically leads to proportionate
taxation. For reasons I have explored elsewhere, that argument must rest on assumptions
about the distributive effects of pretax prices that are wildly implausible on their face, and
impossible to reconcile with other aspects of Gauthier's argument. See id.
In the end, proportionate taxation is such an implausible expression of Gauthier's view
of distributive justice that his enthusiasm for it, like Rawls's, is interesting chiefly as an
illustration of the strength of the irrational pull proportionality exerts on the imagination.
47 TAKINGS, supra note 5, at 163-64.
48
49

Id. at 162.

Id. at 3-5, 163-64. See also Taxation, supra note 5, at 52-53, "noting that the baseline against which being better off is measured gives to each person only his natural rights
to liberty and property, and not the fruits acquired by theft, aggression, or deception." For
Gauthier's similar conclusion, see GAUTHIER, supra note 14, at 254, arguing that each share
in the joint gains from society should be "proportioned to the contributions of its
recipients."
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question only from the third; the perch shared by most of his fellow libertarians.5 0
Locke's state, like Hobbes's, Epstein argues, gets its legitimacy from the strict pareto-superiority of the deal it offers its
members: give up the formal freedom you possessed when locked
in your war of each against all, in return for constraints of law
that will leave all of you at least as well off, and some of you better
off, than you were in the SON. For Hobbes, that guarantee of
strict paretianism defined the full extent of the sovereigu's obligations to its citizens. For Locke, however, it merely set a floor on
those obligations. While Hobbes's sovereign was free to appropriate virtually all the surplus value of civilization, Locke's was not:
"[in the Lockean world, . . . the sovereign is to be fully constrained, so that the lives, liberties, and estates of the citizens
may be preserved. The tangible measure of that constraint is that
principled.., limits are placed upon the appropriation of surplus
by the sovereign."51
As Epstein acknowledges, Locke himself did not supply those
principled limits. Epstein does so in his stead, concluding that the
surplus "should be divided among all citizens, pro rata in accordance with their private holdings."5 2 Why? Epstein, along with nu5o Epstein's idiosyncratic constitutional argument for dividing surplus in proportion
to rights in a state of nature, in brief, is as follows: (1) the just compensation clause extends to taxation as well as conventional takings; (2) the "public use" requirement in the
just compensation clause mandates proportionality between the benefits and burdens of
any public taking; and (3) the requirement of proportionality mandates that all surplus
value created by the state be distributed in accordance with the value of assets people bring
into the state. His utilitarian argument for pro rata division of the surplus, in brief, is that
such division "does not skew the incentives of private parties in the choice between public
and private control over human affairs. For example, if each person received an equal portion of the general gain, there would be an incentive for persons with smaller shares to
force matters into the public arena, where they would be relative gainers." TAKINGS, supra
note 5, at 163. The utilitarian argument fails for the same reasons that the Lockean one
does: the private market does not reward individuals in proportion to the value of their
rights in the state of nature, and such pro rata division of the surplus would not, in any
event, give rise to a proportionate tax.
51 Id.
52 Id. For those familiar with Takings, that conclusion is presented in the pie chart of
two concentric circles that opens the book. Id. at 3-6. The view that the surplus value
created by a Hobbesian state ought to be divided pro rata in accordance with individuals'
SON holdings is fundamental to Epstein's view of a just society. See id. at 3, 5: "The implicit normative limit upon the use of political power is that it should preserve the relative
entitlements among the members of the group, both in the formation of the social order and
in its ongoing operation.... Each gain from public action therefore is uniquely assigned to
some individual, so that none is left to the state, transcending its citizens." Epstein asserts
it largely as fiat in Takings. In Bargainingwith the State, he defends it with a number of
arguments, including that a vastly unequal division of surplus will be an unstable solution
and a pro rata division a stable one, an argument reminiscent of Gauthier's game-theoretic
arguments for pro rata division; that it minimizes the chance that some party will be left in
a pareto-inferior position by the taxes-for-civilization deal, and that it (tautologically)
"leads to the automatic proration of the surplus among all contenders." EPSTEIN, supra
note 27, at 90-91, 95-97. The first two arguments rest on empirical premises that seem
doubtful, or at the very least in need of some defense.
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merous others with libertarian leanings going back to Adam
Smith, appears to derive that conclusion from an unexamined
analogy to private partnerships.5 3 The general line of argument
goes as follows. Think of society as an n-person joint venture, in
which we all bring to the table our SON assets, which we agree to
pool in this collective venture called the state in return for our
aliquot share of the returns to investment, or surplus, that our
cooperation generates. If this were a private partnership between
two persons, one putting up $60,000 of capital and one putting up
$40,000, it is perfectly clear that the two partners would and
should agree to split the profits from their venture 60/40, in accordance with their contributions. There is no reason for that conclusion to change when we move from a two-person private
partnership to an n-person public one.
There are a number of serious problems with the analogy.54
The first is: how do we value SON assets for purposes of calculating what would be a fair (pro rata) return on them? As Epstein
concedes, his two-pie structure "presupposes that we have a very
clear sense of what counts as individual rights."55 Much of the
criticism of Epstein's Takings, along with Nozick's Anarchy, State,
and Utopia and other libertarian schemes, has sought to argue
that such a "clear sense" is impossible to come by, and that what
Epstein et al. take to be the boundaries simply reflects conventional Anglo-American property arrangements that would be impossible to deduce from any deep-seated theory of natural rights.
I want to set those objections aside for the moment, and suppose
Some notion of equal proportionate division of surplus is fundamental to Gauthier's
view of a just society as well, although the precise notion is less clear. As noted below,
Gauthier suggests in passing the standard solution by analogy to partnerships-returnsin-proportion-to-investment-proposed by Epstein and others. But the version he develops
in depth in Morals by Agreement, under the rubric "minimax relative concession" (MRC),
rejects that model entirely. For further discussion of these matters, see FRIED, supra note
46.
53 See SMITH, supra note 16, at 945: "The subjects of every state ought to contribute
towards the support of the government... in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state. The expense of government to the individuals
of a great nation, is like the expence [sic] of management to the joint tenants of a great
estate, who are all obliged to contribute in proportion to their respective interests in the
estate." Among contemporary libertarians, see, for example, GAUTHIER, supra note 14, at
140-41, 152, 254. "mhe ratio between the benefit [each member of society] receives and
the contribution she makes is, so far as possible, constant, the same for all." Id. at 152.
Gauthier's actual scheme for dividing the surplus value generated by society, however,
abandons that principle entirely. See supra note 46.
54 For these purposes, I accept the conventional libertarian premise that individuals
are entitled to what they have acquired by Lockean principles in the SON. To the extent
one rejects that premise, because, for example, one does not regard as just the natural
distribution of talents, or the distribution of resources by grab in the SON, SON entitlements lack justificatory significance, and as a consequence, arguments for distributing surplus pro rata in accordance with those entitlements will lack justificatory weight as well.
55 TAKINGS, supra note 5, at 5.
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that we could come up with some formal boundaries on such natural rights. The question is: what are they worth in the SON?
Epstein concedes that the value of rights in the SON may be
low, due to uncertainty and insecurity.5 6 That concession, however, is hardly damaging to his argument. The real problem is,
how would we determine the value in the SON to begin with?
Rather than hazarding an answer-a daunting thought experiment-Epstein simply assumes that the value of rights in the
SON are a scaled-down version of the value of rights in society.
Thus, if Brains is earning 100 times more than Brawn in America
circa 1999, we are to assume that the use value of Brains's human
capital in the SON was 100 times higher than the use value of
Brawn's. As discussed below, this assumption that people's endowments retain the same relative values in moving from SON to
society is critical to Epstein's argument for proportionate taxation;
it also seems completely unfounded.
The second problem is, what portion of the surplus value generated by civilization is subject to division by collective decisionmaking? In the typical private joint venture envisioned in the 60/
40 partnership example above, the answer is relatively clear.
First, the boundaries between the partnership's activities and the
separate activities of each partner are typically clearly demarcated, and hence that portion of social wealth attributable to the
returns to the partnership's activities clearly demarcated as well.
In committing their respective $60,000 and $40,000 to their joint
venture, each partner implicitly commits to dividing those returns
by some collectively agreed-to decision rule.
The answer to the question, however, is far from clear in the
context of the Lockean social contract. What exactly are the
boundaries of the partnership we are embarked upon here? Does
it extend only to the creation and operations of the formal state, or
does it extend to social organization in any form? Epstein and
others appear to make the latter assumption, in assuming that
the entire (aggregate) increase in wealth we all realized in moving
from the SON to America circa 1999 is subject to division by collective decisionmaking. That broad view, of course, implies that
the enormous gains society bestows on those whose natural talents have little use value on their Crusoeian island are all up for
grabs. One could take this view of our implicit (Lockean) social
contract, pursuant to which all the gains that, say, Wayne Gretsky realizes by moving from being Wayne Gretsky alone on a desert island, thinking of inventing a game called hockey if he could
ever find ice, eleven other players, and an audience to pay to
watch, to being Wayne Gretsky in late twentieth-century America
56 Id. at 3.
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earning $20 million a year, are thrown into a common pool for division in accordance with some norm of just distribution. This is
certainly a plausible moral view, with a number of respectable adherents. 7 But it seems like an odd concession to collectivist ethics
for libertarians to make. One would expect them to insist that a
smaller portion of the gains to Gretsky from civilization is fair
game for redivision among all citizens."8 Limiting what is up for
grabs to that portion of private gains directly attributable to the
provision of specific, costly, public goods, is one possibility-a view
that implicitly limits the scope of the social contract to the operations of the formal state. Nozick and others have suggested another: that the only thing that should be up for grabs is that
portion of income that exceeds what the best endowed could have
gotten, not by staying in the SON, but instead by seceding from
the existing state and forming a new state whose membership was
limited to the best endowed.5 9
Third, assuming that America circa 1999 represents one great
joint venture, with each participant entitled to some share of the
aggregate returns to civilization, how are those returns to be divided among the participants? A pro rata division, in accordance
with the value of assets contributed, is an obvious solution only if
one is dealing with inputs that have an opportunity cost (expected
return outside the partnership) equal to their value inside the
partnership. That condition is presumably met in the 60/40 partnership example above, if we assume the partners' only contributions are (fungible) cash, which is rQceiving a marginal
(competitive) return. In such a case, the constraints of the market-the opportunity cost of capital-dictate a pro rata division of
the partnership's income, whatever justice might require, and
most people would take that result to be consonant with what justice in fact requires.
But in the Lockean social contract, the value of each person's
assets is (by hypothesis) greater if exploited within the joint venture of civilization than it is outside of that joint venture in the
SON. That is to say, the Lockean social contract resembles an nperson multilateral monopoly rather than a competitive equilibrium. Imagine, for example, that in our two-person partnership,
partner A contributes a really good idea, which requires $100,000
in ready cash to exploit, and partner B contributes the $100,000the only person, as it turns out, that was willing to come up on the
57 See, e.g., RAwLS, supra note 4, at 520-29; KENNETH J. ARRow, SOCIAL CHOICE AND
JUSTICE 188 (1983).
58 This position is, of course, just a variant of the point made above, concerning the
level of aggregation at which to test the pareto-superiority of civilization.
59 NOZICK, supra note 24, at 192-93. For a similar argument implicit in his parable of
the greens and the purples, see GAUTHIER, supra note 14, at 284-86.
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spot with the required cash. Now, there are gains from cooperation in excess of the returns available to either partner from her
next best available opportunity. To that extent, they are, with respect to each other, locked in a bilateral monopoly. How should
returns from our grand joint venture be divided now?
The problem presents one instance of the allocation-of-common-costs problem that has been subject to extensive analysis in
the game theory literature. The question is, how should the common costs of a value-enhancing cooperative venture be allocated
among the cooperating parties? While a detailed treatment of the
issue is beyond the scope of this paper, a brief overview may be
helpful in framing the problem.
In game-theoretic analyses, the possible solutions ("core") of
the common-costs problem are taken to include all allocations that
give each player in the cooperative game a payoff at least as great
as the greater of (1) what she could have secured through a noncooperative strategy, and (2) what she could have achieved as a
member of the most profitable coalition of players that could secede from the group to pursue their own cooperative strategy2 °
Clearly, condition (1) requires that each person get a return from
civilization (net of taxes) at least equal to the value of her assets
in the SON-that the choice be individually rational. (This, of
course, correlates with the minimal pareto condition imposed at
the maximum level of aggregation.) Condition (2) adds the additional requirement of group rationality; it just restates in a
slightly different form Nozick's secession thought experiment, described above. 61 Nozick is concerned with defining the extent of
private gains that are up for grabs at all; condition (2) is concerned with defining how such gains should be divided. But the
two are just different paths to the same conclusion: the best endowed group in society (and by extension each lesser endowed
group in turn) will claim for itself, at a minimum, that portion of
the gains from social cooperation that it could have achieved by
seceding from America circa 1999 and forming a new state whose
membership is limited to the best endowed.
What if anything do the above conditions imply about the appropriate division of surplus from society? First, the strict requirement of individual or group rationality holds as a descriptive
matter-that is, predicts the actual outcomes in allocating common costs-only where exit from the group is possible and
60 For a discussion of this "stand alone property," see Lewis Kornhauser, FairDivision
of Settlements: A Comment on Silver and Baker, 84 VA. L. REV. 1561, 1568-72 (1998);
HERVE MOULrN, AxioMs OF COOPERATIVE DECISIONMAKING, 89-95 (1988). I am indebted to
Lewis Kornhauser for pointing out the relevance of the standard allocation-of-commoncosts analysis to the problem at hand.
61 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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costless. To the extent that it is costly for the best endowed members of society (and by extension any other subgroup) to secede
from America circa 1999 to form their more perfect union, the
gains they could have realized in that more perfect union are, as a
purely positive matter, expropriable by the less well-endowed majority. This, of course, describes to a considerable extent the situation facing the very rich in this society." In such a case, what, if
any, normative force does condition (2) carry? Are we required to
abide by the distributive results the best endowed could have obtained for themselves were exit costless, even though it is not, and
if so, why?
Assuming that we are, in fact, morally required to abide by
condition (2) (the results of the Nozickean thought experiment),
what does it imply about the appropriate division of surplus from
society? As Kenneth Arrow has argued, if there are no increasing
returns to scale for society and no externalities, in a large enough
economy where no individual is large on the scale of the economy,
"the core shrinks to the competitive equilibrium."" That is to say,
condition (2) leads to whatever division of surplus happens to result from market prices, and there is, as Arrow states, no problem
of social justice left at all.64 In such a world, taxation is presumably relegated to a pure benefits tax, with rates set to mimic (as far
as possible) the prices the market would itself set for publicly provided goods or services.
If there are increasing returns to scale from organized society,
generating significant gains from nonsecession for any subgroup,
including the best-endowed, the range of solutions in the core is
less clear.' Contrary to Epstein's, Gauthier's, and others' apparent assumption, however, there is unlikely to be any unique solution to the problem, and an allocation that assigns surplus (net of
taxes) in proportion to the value of SON assets is not necessarily
even in the core of the game.6

62 Given the inherent administrative limitations of an income tax, which does not tax
leisure, the rich do of course have a less costly means of exit available to them if tax rates
get high enough: to trade off productive labor for (untaxed) leisure. As a practical matter,
that form of exit is likely to constrain political choice far more than the more extreme sort
of exit contemplated here.
63 ARRow, supra note 57, at 188.
64 Id.
65 For the thoughtful argument that there are, in a deep sense, such increasing returns to scale from organized society, see ARnow, supra note 58, at 188. I am indebted to
Marvin Chirelstein for bringing this passage to my attention.
66 For a proof of the latter proposition in the context of joint litigation costs, see Lewis
Kornhauser, Control of Conflicts of Interest in Class Action Suits, 41 PUBLIC CHOICE 145
(1983).
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Would Pro Rata Division of the Surplus Value of the
Social Contract, in Proportion to the Value of
Individual Rights in a SON, Lead to
Proportionate Taxation to Finance the
Cost of Public Goods?

Epstein, along with numerous others, presumes the answer to
the above question is yes. In fact, the answer is no, unless two
conditions are met: everyone must derive utility from the creation
of the minimal state in proportion to the value of his or her rights
in an SON, and the utility each person derives must all be reflected in income (or whatever other tax base we use). It is extremely unlikely that either of these conditions will be met, let
alone both.
A simple example will illustrate the problem. Suppose we
have a two-person SON society. Person A, a hunter, has rights, in
the form of human capital, with a market value of $10. Person B,
a gatherer, has rights, in the form of human capital, with a market value of $20. The two enter into a compact to create a Nozickean/Lockean minimal state, pursuant to which they forswear
Hobbesian aggression against each other, agree to hire a mercenary police force and army to enforce their Hobbesian contract
against mutual aggression and to defend themselves jointly
against outside aggression, and agree to create a variety of pure
public goods, including a lighthouse, a TV broadcasting system,
and roads. All of these goods and services together cost $100 to
supply.
Due to the advances that civilization has brought, person A is
now able to give up hunting and become a taxi driver for visiting
tourists. She spends her spare time watching television. The total subjective value to her of her rights in civilization is equal to
$230, of which $140 is attributable to income generated by driving
a cab and $90 to the pleasures of watching TV. Person B, in the
meantime, becomes a television technician. He works all the time,
generating a total subjective value to him of $260, equal to the
total market earnings he realizes.
Thus, in our simplified example, the total costs of civilization
are equal to $100, and the total benefits of civilization are $460
($490 total utility in civilization, minus $30 total utility in the
SON), yielding a net surplus value from civilization of $360. How
is the $100 cost of producing that $460 benefit to be divided
through the tax system? Epstein would argue it should be divided such that A ends up with one-third of the total $360 surplus
value, or $120, and B ends up with the remaining $240. But, as
the chart below indicates, that result would mean that A must
bear the entire $100 cost of public goods, and B nothing. In con-
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trast, a proportionate tax on earned income (which in this example totals $400) would take 25% of the earned income from each of
the two, producing a $35 tax bill for A (.25 x $140) and a $65 tax
bill for B (.25 x $290).
EPsTEIN's TALE OF Two PIES

SON (wealth)
LS (wealth)
Epstein tax allocation
After-tax wealth
Net of rights in SON
After-tax share of surplus
Tax allocation under 25%
proportionate tax on
income

A
Hunter Turned
Taxi Driver
$10
$230
($140 income and
$90 imputed income)
$100
$130
-$10
$120
$35

B
Gatherer Turned
TV Repairman
$20
$260
(income)
$0
$260
-$20
$240
$65

Thus, Epstein's "proportionate division of the surplus" rule
clearly produces results that are wildly removed from a proportionate tax on income. In this particular example, it produces a
tax scheme in which 100% of the tax burden falls on the person
with the lower earned income. While that particular result is an
artifact of the numbers chosen, the more general conclusion is not.
Indeed, only by the most implausible coincidence would Epstein's
rule ever produce something approximating proportionality.
To drive the point home, imagine we expand the example to a
four-person SON society, in which, in addition to A and B above,
we also have C, a wily but puny hunter, whose brains compensate
only partially for her absence of brawn, leaving her slightly worse
off than A; and D, a 7 foot 6 inch gatherer whose freakish height
is on the whole a disadvantage for his chosen profession in the
SON economy, leaving him slightly worse off than B. In the
Hobbesian minimal state circa 1999, C becomes a well-paid law
professor, the income from which far outstrips A's or B's, and D
becomes a basketball superstar, the income from which dwarfs
A's, B's and C's. The relative gains to C and D-whose distinguishing talents were completely worthless in the SON-from entering into civilized society are wildly disproportionate to their
relative positions in the SON. As a consequence, a tax designed to
return C and D to their same SON positions relative to A and B
must necessarily fall in a confiscatory manner on C and D.
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WELFARIST/CONSEQUENTIAL THEORIES OF
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

The intuition that tax burdens should be set in a fashion that
minimizes the aggregate burden they entail has long held appeal.
For the latter part of the nineteenth century and first half of the
twentieth, that intuition was most frequently embodied in the notions that tax burdens ought to be allocated in accordance with
"ability to pay," or to "minimize sacrifice." For reasons thoroughly
rehearsed elsewhere, neither "ability to pay" nor "minimum sacrifice" theories have moral coherence as freestanding principles of
distributive justice." They are incomplete intuitions of a deeper,
unarticulated (social welfarist) theory of distributive justice, in
which the state has an obligation to use its fiscal powers to further
the aggregate welfare of society, aggregated in accordance with
some implicit or explicit social welfare function.
Viewed in that larger context, the social welfarist case for any
tax structure judged in isolation is inherently unsatisfactory, for
reasons that critics of "ability-to-pay" and "equal sacrifice" theory
on the right and the left have long recognized. Once we admit
that the redistribution of income for social welfarist ends is a legitimate role for the government, it is morally incoherent to isolate
the tax side from the transfer/expenditure side of the fiscal ledger.
As Wicksell commented many years ago, there is no point in
achieving "a just part in an unjust whole."6" It is operationally
incoherent to isolate the tax side of fiscal affairs as well, for the
simple reason that we can undo any tax distribution on the transfer side. Take the following, simple example. Suppose we have a
two-person society in which Poor earns $1000 and Rich earns
$10,000. Suppose we impose a flat tax of 45% on both Poor and
Rich, thereby reducing Poor's after-tax income to $550 and Rich's
to $5500. Suppose we then take the resulting $4950 in tax revenues, and distribute them in-kind and in cash entirely to Poor.
One would be hard-put to disagree if Rich is heard to complain
that the net result of all this fiscal legerdemain is a confiscatory
tax on Rich for the purpose of achieving absolute income equality
between Rich and Poor. 9
67 See MUSGRAVE, supra note 17, at

90-115.

68 KNUT WICKSELL, FINANZTHEORETISCHE

UNTERSUCHUNGEN UND DAS STEUERWESEN

SCHWEDEN'S 143 (Jena 1896) quoted in translationin MUSGRAVE, supra note 17, at 72. See
also Edgeworth's and Pigou's observations to the same end, both cited in MUSGRAVE, supra
note 17, at 111; discussion in FRIED, supra note 30, at 154-55.
69 The potential for undoing any tax distribution on the transfer side has not been lost
on the right, although proponents of proportionality on libertarian grounds probably have
underestimated the extent to which it undercuts any fairness arguments for proportional
tax rates judged in isolation. See, e.g., HAYEK, supra note 1, at 307 (recognizing the potential for effecting radical redistribution through use of proportionate tax and differential
transfers to the lower classes, but assuming that potential is limited in practice by the
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What an optimal tax-and-transfer scheme would look like
under a plausible range of social welfare functions giving priority
to the needs of the worst-off has been much debated. The central
problem, of course, is how to balance welfare gains (assuming a
declining marginal utility of income) from redistributing income to
the poor, against welfare losses from the distortionary effects of
taxes required to finance the redistribution. It has been suggested
that a degressive tax, or even a tax rate structure that declines
slightly at the top, may well be optimal if combined with substantial lump-sum transfers (so-called demogrants).7 ° The intuition
behind flattening rates at the top is that the last, or marginal,
incremental decision to work or save is most sensitive to tax rates.
In a world with perfect information, each person would have her
own optimal tax schedule, with rates set very high on inframarginal earnings, and declining, ultimately to zero, on the
last (marginal) dollar earned. In our actual world, where we cannot observe people's true preferences, a degressive tax structure
might best approximate that ideal result. More recent work has
cast doubt on the efficiency arguments for a degressive tax, suggesting that, at least in some contexts, in particular, in winnertake-all markets and contexts where work and savings decisions
are driven by a desire for relative status, steeply graduated rates
may well be more efficient than flat rates. 71 The larger point, however, remains clear. The case for any tax structure on social
welfarist grounds is purely derivative of prior moral commitments
to a particular social welfare function, and empirical hunches
about the combination of tax and transfer schemes that will best
effect it.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, many thoughtful people, proceeding on social welfarist premises, have found it irresistible to
assess the desirability of a given tax arrangement in isolation
from the transfer side of fiscal affairs. This approach is perhaps
an inevitable occupational hazard for professional tax types,
whose habitual frame of reference and claims to expertise both
push toward that partial view. It may also, in some cases, sensibly reflect political exigencies. If a decisionmaker is limited, as a
political matter, to affecting the distribution of tax burdens, then
it is perfectly sensible for her to take all other variables as given.
inflexibility of in-kind transfers as a tool for income redistribution). Of course, once one
admits the possibility of straight cash transfers, that problem goes away.
70 See Bankman & Griffith, supra note 21, at 1955-58.
71 For a very suggestive treatment of these issues, see ROBERT H. FRANK AND PHILIP J.
COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SocIETY (1995), and Robert H. Frank, Progressive Taxation
and the Incentive Problem, Working Paper no. 98-4 (Off. Tax Pol'y Res., U. of Mich. Bus.
Sch., 1998). For a much earlier treatment of the relative status problem along the same
lines in a slightly different context, see A.C. Pioou, A STUDY IN PUBLIC FINANCE 90 (3d rev.
ed. 1947).
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The tendency for social welfarists to assess the fairness of tax burdens, divorced from the government's other fiscal functions, extends far beyond the foregoing situations, however, to include
those who are trying to work out a just scheme of income distribution de novo. Perhaps the most recent striking example is Rawls.
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls suggests that the fairest tax
scheme for raising funds to "provide for the public goods and make
the transfer payments necessary to satisfy the difference principle" would be a proportional consumption tax. 72 Rawls offers the
suggestion in passing, as a part of a hodgepodge of proposed fiscal
arrangements to effect a just state, and it seems doubtful that he
has thought through the implications of any of these institutional
arrangements very clearly." At any rate, one suspects he would
think better of many of them on further reflection.
RAwLs, supra note 4, at 278-79.
Following Musgrave, Rawls divides the government into four functions: the allocative, stabilization, transfer, and distribution branches. For our purposes, only the latter
two are relevant. The transfer branch Rawls defines as concerned with guaranteeing a
social minimum, provided either piecemeal by family allowances, special payments for sickness, and employment, or more systematically by a negative income tax. RAwLS, supra
note 4, at 275. He subdivides the distribution branch into two functions: (1) regulating
intergenerational transfers, through gift and estate taxes and restrictions on rights of bequests, in order to "prevent concentrations of power detrimental to the fair value of political
liberty and fair equality of opportunity," id. at 277; and (2) raising tax revenues necessary
to "provide for the public goods and make the transfer payments necessary to satisfy the
difference principle," id. at 278.
There are a number of peculiarities here. First, it would seem that the guaranteed
minimum income that is the focus of the transfer branch should be subsumed under transfers necessary to satisfy the difference principle, the task of the second leg of the distribution branch. Rawls himself seems to concede as much, in stating that "[olnce the difference
principle is accepted, however, it follows that the minimum is to be set at that point which,
taking wages into account, maximizes the expectations of the least advantaged group." Id.
at 285.
Second, it is not clear why the first and second legs of the distribution branch should be
treated as distinct. Why single out intergenerational transfers as a unique violation of the
just state that need to be dealt with through their own institutions, rather than simply
treating them as one of many possible sources of inequality that all require governmental
correction in accordance with the difference principle? One customary reason for distinguishing intergenerational gratuitous transfers from other sources of wealth, such as labor
income and returns to one's own lifetime savings, is because the former is regarded as
uniquely "unearned" and hence undeserved. See FRIED, supra note 30, at 97-99; ERIc
RAKowSKi,EQUAL JUSTIcE 158-62 (1991). Whatever the problems with this view-and they
have been much debated over the centuries-the view is clearly not one congenial to Rawls.
Rawls, consistent with his broad view of undeserved privilege, explicitly states that "[t]he
unequal inheritance of wealth is no more inherently unjust than the unequal inheritance of
intelligence," and that "as far as possible inequalities founded on either should satisfy the
difference principle." RAwLS, supra note 4, at 278. This statement suggests that wealth
from inheritance should be treated like wealth from any other source, presumably all under
the second distribution branch. The second danger that Rawls suggests is posed by inherited wealth-that when it creates inequalities in wealth that exceed a certain limit, it
threatens "the fair value of political liberty and fair equality of opportunity" in society, id.
at 277-likewise suggests no ground for separating inherited wealth from any other source
of wealth. If the concentration of wealth is what matters, the source should not.
Finally, Rawls's hostility to intergenerational transfers is hard to reconcile with the
solicitude he shows to savers in supporting a consumption tax in place of an income tax.
72

73
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In defense of a proportional rate structure-the element of
the scheme of relevance here-Rawls notes only that "it treats
everyone in a uniform way (... assuming that income is fairly
earned)."7 4 At the outset, Rawls's argument runs smack into the
same difficulty faced by most libertarian defenders of a flat-rate
tax: the tax rate structure Rawls supports is, in fact, not a proportionate one, but a degressive one, since Rawls, like most other proponents of proportionality, would permit the "usual exemptions
for dependents." 5 Whatever other merits such a scheme might
have, it surely lacks the virtue of "uniformity" as that word is used
here. Setting that difficulty aside, the form of uniformity or equality that Rawls implicitly champions here, equal percentages of income taken, is hardly an obvious solution to the question,
"equality of what?," a matter to be returned to shortly. That point
is underscored by noting that the difference principle Rawls would
use in setting transfers adopts a quite different notion of uniformity: uniformity of absolute income levels after tax and transfer,
subject to the exception for inequalities that help the least well off.
That last observation brings us to what is surely the greatest
oddity of Rawls's championing of a flat-rate tax. In the context of
the overall Rawlsian scheme, the right not to have one's income
taxed at a higher marginal rate than one's neighbor's stands as an
island of deontological rights swamped by a sea of redistribution.
As the above example of Rich and Poor illustrates, 6 if the proceeds of a Rawlsian tax are used to finance the transfers to the
least well off required by the difference principle, the fact that the
rich are treated "uniformly" with the poor on the tax side should
be cold comfort to them, and a matter of total moral indifference to
a Rawlsian.
Indeed, the same criticism Rawls rightly makes at "traditional criteria" for fair taxation, ability to pay and benefits theory,
can be made of Rawls's proposed tax scheme: it does not "take a
The salient difference between a consumption tax and an income tax is the treatment of
savings: a consumption tax exempts from taxation at least some forms of capital income
currently taxed under our income tax. See Joseph Bankman & Barbara H. Fried, Winners
and Losers in the Shift to a Consumption Tax, 86 GEO. L.J. 539, 540-42 (1998). In defense
of a consumption tax base, Rawls appeals to the "common sense precepts of justice," precisely the ones that appealed to Hobbes some three hundred years ago, that "itimposes a
levy according to how much a person takes out of the common store of goods and not according to how much he contributes (assuming here that income is fairly earned)." RAwLs,
supra note 4, at 278. Whatever the merits of this position, the statement is hard to reconcile with Rawls's position on intergenerational transfers. Given that a significant portion
of lifetime savings, at least among the wealthy, is destined for intergenerational transfer
through inter vivos gifts and bequests, the choice to protect the return to savings, via a
consumption tax, during a taxpayer's lifetime, while burdening the same decision heavily
upon death, seems to require some justification.
74 RAwLs, supra note 4, at 278-79.
75 Id. at 278.
76 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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sufficiently comprehensive point of view" of the government's role
in securing a just distribution of income. 7
As a final oddity in Rawls's defense of proportionality, Rawls
suggests that flat rates are obviously fair only in an already just
world. Given the injustice of existing institutions, Rawls argues,
there may be a role for "even steeply progressive income taxes."75
By "injustice," Rawls appears to mean here a world in which not
all income is "fairly earned."79 It is hard to figure out what this
essentially Nozickean principle of rectification is doing in a Rawlsian world. Given Rawls's view that talents, including a taste for
hard work, are undeserved, and hence the income derived from
those talents undeserved, what could it mean to Rawls for a person to earn income fairly, such that it was not up for grabs under a
steeply progressive income tax?
In the end, the impossibility of making any logical sense, in
the context of his larger aims, of Rawls's positions on tax policy in
general, and rate structures in particular, makes those positions
of more than common interest-not in justifying those positions,
but in appreciating the breadth and strength of the irrational pull
they exert. If Rawls, of all people, could think a flat tax a just tax
because "it treats everyone in a uniform way," surely there is some
powerful instinct at work here that resists logic. What is it?
IV.

EQUALITY OF

TAx BURDENS AS A PERCENTAGE OF INCOME AS
A DEFAULT POSITION

Rawls may be the most surprising expositor of the view that a
flat tax is the fairest tax of all, but he is hardly alone. Many people believe (1) that one can assess the fairness of a tax system in
isolation from government expenditures or any other government
policies affecting the distribution of wealth, and (2) that viewing
our tax system from such a perspective, a proportionate tax
scheme is the self-evidently fairest one, because, in the words of
Rawls, "it treats everyone in a uniform [that is, equal] way." 0 Indeed, for many, flat rates (or more precisely a degressive rate
structure) appear to be the only feature of the tax system that is
mandated on fairness grounds."'
77 RAWLS,
78
79

supra note 4, at 280.

Id. at 279.

Or so I infer from his repeated insistence on this qualification on his support for a
flat-rate consumption tax in the preceding passage. Id. at 278-79. Rawls doesn't state explicitly what injustices he has in mind here.
so Id.
81 Epstein, for example, treats all other fundamental choices in tax system, including
the choice of a taxable base, double taxation at the corporate level, the realization requirement, the home mortgage interest deduction, and the preferential treatment of capital
gains, as normatively discretionary calls, on the empirical assumption that the resolution
of each of these questions will have little systematic impact on the distribution of surplus.
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Everyone is in favor of equality. The question, of course, is
"equality of what?" Why this particular version of equality, taking
an equal percentage of everyone's income, has had such widespread and persistent appeal is something of a mystery. It has
history on its side, of course, in the biblical tradition of tithing, but
that merely pushes the mystery one step back.
To take the case for proportionality in its most sympathetic
posture, let us assume that the beneficiaries of public expenditures are absolutely impossible to trace, thereby precluding any
benefits-theory-based defense for any rate structure. We can invoke here Blum and Kalven's helpful suggestion that we treat the
collection of taxes "as though it were only a common disaster-as
though the tax money once collected were thrown into the sea."82
Let us also assume that the state has no legitimate, social
welfarist interest in redistribution, and that we take the background distribution of pretax incomes as just. In this limited context, in which the fairness of tax burdens is to be judged
completely in isolation, can we say anything at all about their just
distribution?
For most people, the default assumption in such a case, where
taxes are, in Blum and Kalven's words, "a necessary evil falling8
upon a distribution of money... which is otherwise acceptable,"
is that the tax burden ought to be shared equally by all taxpayers.
This view is obviously reflected in the longstanding argument, going back at least to Mill, for "equal sacrifice" in taxation.' That
argument, however, simply raises the question adumbrated
above, equality of what?
supra note 5, at 300-02. That assumption is almost certainly wrong with respect
to many of these items, given the highly skewed distribution of capital income in this country. The only other tax policy choice attracting constitutional scrutiny from Epstein is industry-specific tax breaks like percentage depletion for oil and gas.
Others, of course, notably including Rawls, have argued that the choice of tax base
(consumption versus income) raises fundamental issues of fairness. That argument is conspicuously absent, however, from most contemporary defenses of the so-called Hall/
Rabushka flat tax championed by Steve Forbes and adopted as the model for the Armey/
Shelby plan now pending before Congress. The Hall/Rabushka plan, along with most socalled flat tax schemes, adopts a consumption tax base in place of an income tax base, in
addition to shifting from a graduated to a degressive rate structure. Notwithstanding that
fact, as Larry Zelenak argues at length in his piece for this symposium, most proponents of
the plans on fairness grounds are conspicuously silent about the former change. Lawrence
Zelenak, The Selling of the Flat Tax: The Dubious Link Between Base and Rate, 2 CHAP.L.
REV.197 (1999). Hall and Rabushka themselves, for example, completely ignore the consumption tax feature of their proposal in their 30-page defense of the fairness of their flat
TAKINGS,

tax.

HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 7, at 23-51.
82 Blum & Kalven, supra note 6, at 517.
83
84

Id. at 460.

For typical expressions of that view, see Taxation, supra note 5, at 73-74 (where the
benefits and other costs of government are hard to assess, "a test of equal treatment across
taxpayers becomes the next best alternative"); Blum & Kalven, supra note 6, at 460 (if
taxes are a necessary evil falling on a distribution of income otherwise just, the object is "to
leave all taxpayers equally 'worse off after taxes").
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Now, we are plunged into a long-running dispute, well-documented elsewhere, and I do not propose to rehash it at length
here."5 In brief, commentators have disagreed about the proper
meaning of both equality and sacrifice, in interpreting "equality of
sacrifice." Two principal measures of equality have been proposed: equal absolute sacrifice, and equal proportionate sacrifice
(in proportion, that is, either to income or to any substitute taxable base). 8 Two principal measures of sacrifice have been proposed: that sacrifice should be measured by the utility of dollars
relinquished, and that it should be measured by dollars
relinquished.
The resulting four-cell matrix obviously yields four different
interpretations of "equality of sacrifice." Of the four, only oneequal proportionate sacrifice measured by dollars relinquishedunambiguously (indeed, definitionally) leads to a flat-rate tax.
Equal proportionatesacrifice measured by the utility of dollars relinquished under most plausible utility schedules for money would
yield a progressive rate structure. Equal absolute sacrifice measured by dollars relinquished obviously yields a highly regressive
head tax. Equal absolute sacrifice measured by the utility of dollars relinquished is the most ambiguous: under differing but
plausible assumptions about the declining marginal utility of income, it could imply a regressive, proportionate, or progressive
rate structure. 7
What, then, explains the apparently widely shared intuition
that the equality principle should be interpreted to require equal
proportionate sacrifice, measured by dollars relinquished? The
choice to use dollars, rather than the utility of dollars, as a measure of sacrifice, does not seem hard to defend. Indeed, the contrary choice, adopted by numerous tax theorists over the last
century, is much harder to understand.8 We customarily measure the price exacted for goods or services by nominal dollars
paid, not by the subjective disutility to the payor of relinquishing
those dollars. Opting for the latter measure here-a measure
85 See Blum & Kalven, supra note 6, at 455-65; MUSGRAVE, supra note 17, at 90-98;
FRIED, supra note 30, at 153-54.
86 The third measure proposed by Mill, equimarginal sacrifice, was rightly dismissed
by friends and foes alike as nothing more than a stand-in for utilitarian concerns. See
FRIED,
87

supra note 30, at 154-55.

See MUSGAVE, supra note 17, at 99-100; Blum & Kalven, supra note 6, at 458-59.
David Gauthier, to take one recent example, assumes that the measure (which he supports
in a convoluted fashion) would result in a flat-rate tax. GAUTHIER, supra note 14, at 272.
There is clearly no more empirical, or even strong intuitive, support for that conclusion,

however, than for the alternative Friedmanesque assumption, which Gauthier rejects, that
the quantity of public goods people consume is proportionate to their income. Id. at 271.
88 See, e.g., Antonio de Viti de Marco, cited in MUSGRAVE, supra note 17, at 73; FRIED,
supra note 30, at 154-55, 301 nn.261-62. For a more recent defense of utility as a measure
of sacrifice, see GAUTHIER, supra note 14, at 271-72.
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that, under conventional assumptions of the diminishing marginal
utility of wealth, is inversely correlated with initial wealth-is
hard to explain except as an indirect way to smuggle in the very
redistributive objectives that we ruled out of bounds at the start of
this inquiry, when we took the background pretax distribution of
incomes as just.8 9
The former choice, however-the choice of proportionateover
equal absolute sacrifice-seems much harder to defend. Probably
the most famous, albeit indirect, brief for proportionate taxation,
Blum and Kalven's "Uneasy Case," has only two things to say on
behalf of the fairness of flat rates in the course of its 100-page
assault on graduated rates. The first is that "[als a principle of
justice [proportionate sacrifice] is intuitively attractive."90 The
second is that the "virtue of the proportionate sacrifice formula is
that it remains neutral as to the relative distribution of satisfactions among taxpayers." 91 Virtually all defenses of proportionality
ultimately boil down to some variant of the former "I know fairness when I see it" claim, or the latter tautology. In the tautological vein, for example, consider Hall and Rabushka's argument
that "[tihe principle of equity embodied in the flat tax is that every
taxpayer pays taxes in direct proportion to his income. '"2 Or consider Hayek's: while progression represents "discrimination
no problem of a sepagainst the wealthy,"9 3 proportionality "raises
94
arate rule applying only to a minority."
Can we do no better than this? The usual starting point for
implementing equality-based norms is that people who are identical in relevant respects should be treated identically. The case for
89 Gauthier attempts to justify a utility measure of sacrifice as not redistributive in
intent here by reference to his notion of "minimax relative concession" (MRC). GAUTHIER,
supra note 14, at 271-72, and note 46, supra. In brief, MRC requires an equal division of
the joint gains from cooperation, including gains from the cooperative provision of public
goods. Gauthier argues that a head tax will violate the requirements of MRC, because
under a head tax "a person with fewer resources will lose a greater proportion of the gain
he would realize were he to obtain the good at no [tax] cost." Id. at 272. Presumably, this
result follows in Gauthier's mind from the declining marginal utility of income: since dollars are worth more to the poor, a head tax strips from them more absolute utility, and
hence a greater absolute share of the surplus. But if the utility of tax dollars given up to
purchase public goods is greater, so also, presumptively, is the utility of public goods retained, net of taxes (that is, the poor's share of the surplus from cooperation less their share
of the tax costs). If so, Gauthier's requirement that surplus be divided equally, in utility
terms, seems more plausibly to lead to a steeply regressive tax than a flat tax. At any rate,
it requires some odd assumptions about the shape of marginal utility curves over the relevant ranges to conclude otherwise. In the end, Gauthier's inclination to measure gain by
utility, like his inclination to equalize the division of surplus under MRC, seems hard to
explain except as an expression of egalitarian impulses that are uneasily reconciled with
the libertarian premises of his project.
9o Blum & Kalven, supra note 6, at 460.
91 Id.
92 HALL & RABusHKA, supra note 7, at 27.
93 HAYEx, supra note 1, at 313.
94 Id. at 314-15.
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any tax rate structure that is tied to the level of income, be it progressive, proportionate or even regressive, thus depends on showing that income levels are morally relevant in setting differential
tax burdens. In the case of benefits theory or social welfarist approaches, the claim for moral relevance of income levels is obvious.
In the case of benefits theory, income is taken as a proxy for benefit levels; in the case of social welfarist approaches, whether embodied in inchoate form in "ability to pay" arguments or full-blown
optimal tax analyses, income (or capacity to generate income, as
reflected in actual income) is taken as the prime measure of welfare. If the justice of tax burdens is really to be judged in isolation
from either the distribution of government benefits or the desired
end-state distribution of income, however, it is difficult to see why
income levels would ever be relevant in measuring equal treatment. The far more plausible measure of equality under those
conditions would seem to be equal treatment of individuals, a
premise that would seem to lead to a head tax. Indeed, Blum and
Kalven argue as much in another context, in attacking Mill's
"equimarginal sacrifice" as a plausible interpretation of equality.
If we are really confining discussion to how we should allocate a
burden, and are ignoring benefits and distributive concerns, Blum
and Kalven argue, the principle of equimarginal equality "seems
not a little absurd ....
[Ilt is strange indeed to have [two men]
share a common burden by putting all of it on the wealthier
man."9 5 It is no less absurd in principle, although less extreme in
degree, to put more of it on the wealthier man than the poorer one
just because he is wealthier. At least, it is hard to see how the
absurdity could ever be removed, except by reference to either
benefits theory or social welfarist concerns.
V.

TAXES SHOULD BE LEVIED SO AS TO LEAVE PEOPLE'S
CHOICES UNDISTORTED

A number of commentators with libertarian sympathies have
argued for proportionality on the ground that it would leave people's choices undistorted from what they would have been in a notax world.96 Minimizing tax-induced distortion in behavior is, of
course, the goal of much of public economics, on efficiency grounds.
For Epstein, Gauthier and others, that ideal appears to have libertarian roots, of a Randian/personalist sort. As Epstein put it:
The creation of a system of government should strive not to reduce the scope of permissible individual choice from what it was
before. Accordingly, no person or group should be able to use
the tax system to change the pattern of preferences of other in95 Blum & Kalven, supra note 6, at 470-71.
96 See Taxation, supra note 5, at 74; GAUTHIER, supra note 14, at 272-73.
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dividuals. If A ranks a set of (noncoercive) alternatives 1 to n
before taxation, then A's ranking of those alternatives should
remain 1 to n, without alteration, after the tax is imposed."
This statement is hardly a universally shared interpretation
of the requirements of libertarianism. It treats individual liberty
as residing in undistorted individual choice among actions, rather
than, for example, the utility any particular choice generates.
Thus, nothing in Epstein's example would preclude a near-confiscatory tax on earnings from any source, provided only that it did
not reverse rank orderings of choices. Be that as it may, contrary
to Epstein's assumption, the requirement that we preserve the
rank orderings of choices-including both the choice among kinds
of work and the choice between work and leisure-does not lead in
the first instance to either proportionate taxation or, what Epstein
erroneously takes to be the same thing, a tax system that leaves
the relative wealth of taxpayers constant. 8 It leads to a highly
regressive head tax, endowments tax, or some other form of pure
lump-sum taxation. As a second-best alternative, where lumpsum taxation is politically infeasible or distributionally undesirable, it leads to a Ramsey-type optimal tax on labor or capital, in
which tax rates are set in inverse proportion to the elasticity of
supply, in order to have the tax burden fall, as far as possible, on
suppliers' rents. As discussed above, what precisely such an optimal tax scheme implies about the rate structure in a broad-based
income tax has been much debated, without any definitive conclusion. A case can be made for a degressive, or even a regressive
rate structure at the top of the income scale, on efficiency
grounds." But the choice to opt for any broad-based income tax in
preference to lump-sum taxation in the first instance must be
driven by distributional concerns that are hard to reconcile with
the Randian libertarianism driving Epstein's argument here, or
the more conventional, property rights-based libertarianism reflected in benefits theory.
VI.

POLITICAL ECONOMY ARGUMENTS FOR A FLAT TAX

Proponents of proportionate taxation have offered a variety of
political economy arguments on behalf of flat rates. Perhaps the
most prominent is an argument, chiefly associated with Hayek but
espoused by many others as well, that proportionality, as a rule of
97 Taxation, supra note 5, at 55. For similar comments from Gauthier, see GAUTHIER,
supra note 14, at 272-76.
98 "Iftax neutrality [in this sense] could be perfectly achieved, the laws would act as a
prism which magnified equally all preexisting endowments. The nature of private activities would not change, nor would the relative endowments of private persons." Taxation,
supra note 5, at 56. The former conclusion is true; the latter is decidedly not.
99 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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general application, precludes the majority from imposing upon "a
minority a rule which it does not apply to itself."' ° Such an imposition, Hayek argues, "is an infringement of a principle much more
fundamental than democracy itself, a principle on which the justification of democracy rests." 10 '
Hayek's argument for proportionality here, of course, depends
on the fact that in raising rates on the minority rich, the majority
also raises rates on themselves. Whatever merits the argument
might have as an empirical or normative matter, however, the
property Hayek seizes on here is hardly unique to proportionate
taxation. It is even more true of a head tax, in which any rate
increase imposed on the minority rich will fall on the majority
even more heavily than in a proportionate scheme, a fact Epstein
inadvertently surfaces, in mistakenly defending a flat tax on the
grounds that "[a] rule that says you must pay a dollar for the dollar that you wish to exact from your neighbor" is an important
constraint on political intrigue. 10 2 Indeed, the same property
holds for any rate structure, including a highly progressive one, in
which the rates of each income group are a positively correlated
arithmetical function of the rates imposed on others. With little
ingenuity, one could accommodate virtually any level of progression within that constraint.
There is, however, a further problem with Hayek's argument.
It presumes, as Epstein argues, that "[tihe flat tax gives the government only one degree of freedom: what is the level of the reve°
nues and, hence, of [the tax rate] ?1103
That conclusion is true,

however, only if a flat tax, once enacted, cannot be repealed. If it
can-and unless constitutionalized, it formally can as easily as
the progressive rate structure it has hypothetically replacedthen at any time after a flat-rate structure has been enacted, the
government has not one degree of freedom, but as many as it ever
had, since enactment of a flat-rate structure does not itself preclude the bottom 51% of the population from sticking it to the top
49% at any time, simply by voting to abandon flat rates in favor of
progressive ones. The Hayekian argument, to make any sense,
must therefore depend upon a further assumption: that if one can
persuade people to go for a flat-rate structure to begin with, one
has a higher than (politically) customary chance of persuading
loo HAYEK, supra note 1, at 314. For similar sentiments, see sources cited in Blum &
Kalven, supra note 6, at 435 n.60; Taxation, supra note 5, at 70.
lol HAYEK, supra note 1, at 314. Epstein trumpets the same property of proportionality
for a different reason, arguing that by limiting political choices to one tax rate that applies

to all, proportionality reduces the opportunities for, and hence transactions costs of, factional fighting. Taxation, supra note 5, at 53, 57.
102 Taxation, supra note 5, at 70.
103 Id.
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people to adhere to it going forward. On what could such an assumption be based?
VII.

FLAT RATES AS A SCHELLING-LIKE

FocAL PoiNT

One possible answer lies in the suggestion that the broad appeal of proportionate taxation is attributable less to any easily explicable moral theory than to its operating as a Schelling-like focal
point for people; that is, a solution that is psychologically prominent because of its apparent mathematical certainty, along with
its apparent properties of equality.'0 4 I say apparent mathematical certainty and simplicity, because one can achieve equal or
greater simplicity with other schemes-a head tax, for exampleand equal mathematical certainty from any mathematically determinate function that correlates the tax rates of different income
groups. But that logical quibble is in a sense beside the point
here-the point being that, for whatever psychological or historical reasons, this particular relationship among tax burdens has a
strong pull on the popular imagination.
There is much, particularly in Hayek's writings, to support
the focal-point explanation. It may explain why people as divergent in their political commitments as Rawls and Hayek might fix
on such a solution in good faith to begin with, as unselfconscious
participants in a Schelling-like convergence. It also explains why
proponents of less progressivity than now exists would fix on it as
a strategic matter, as a political solution that is both obtainable
and sustainable. Hayek himself seems to concede as much, when
he acknowledges that he is seeking a principle "which has [a] prospect of being accepted and which would effectively prevent those
temptations inherent in progressive taxation from getting out of
hand," and rejects as an alternative solution "setting an upper
limit which progression is not to exceed." 10 5 The problem with
such a solution, notes Hayek, is that "[s]uch a percentage figure
would be as arbitrary as the principle of progression and would be
as readily altered when the need for additional revenue seemed to
require it." 10 6 Of course, as noted above, a flat-rate scheme could
be altered at will as well, to revert back to a progressive rate
structure. But Hayek has perhaps got hold of a psychological
truth here: a flat-rate structure has a psychological prominence
that may make it easier to sell to voters in the first instance than
many other possible rate structures that are less progressive than
104 See Bankman & Griffith, supra note 21, at 1914. The certainty of a proportionate
rate structure is a recurrent argument offered in its favor. See, e.g., HAYEK, supra note 1,
at 313-14; Blum & Kalven, supra note 6, at 430-35, 511; Luwz, supra note 15, at 70, 73-76.
105 HAYEi,supra note 1, at 323.
106 Id.
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the current one, and may make it more likely, once enacted, to
stick.

VIII.

POLITICAL FRAMING
Finally, the convergence on proportionate taxation seems to
be, in significant part, a product of political framing. Benefits theory, at least under the strict construction of benefits that seems
most congenial to libertarian premises, would almost certainly
lead to a highly regressive tax structure. Most opponents of
progressivity on fairness grounds specifically reject that outcome
as politically unpalatable and hence infeasible. Blum and Kalven,
for example, take a regressive tax off the table, as they took off the
table a tax that does not exempt basic income, not because it is
unpersuasive, but because "[i]t is so clear no one today favors any
tax because it is regressive ... [that] a regressive tax on income is
not a serious [policy] alternative."" ' Richard Epstein takes a head
tax off the table without any justification whatsoever.0 8
That decision permits opponents of a graduated rate structure to narrow and restate their position as follows: "[oin what
grounds is a progressive tax on income to be preferred to a proportionate tax on income?""' 9-or more precisely, for the overwhelming majority of flat-rate proponents who also support an
exemption for basic income, "[oln what grounds is a progressive
tax on all incomes over a minimum subsistence exemption to be
preferred to a proportionate tax on all incomes over a minimum
subsistence exemption?"" 0 Once regressivity is off the table as a
viable alternative, along with a true proportionate tax, a degressive tax becomes the best available alternative to those who are
hostile to the degree of income redistribution effected at the top of
the income scale by a graduated rate structure. Indeed, the whole
structure of Blum and Kalven's implicit argument for proportionality depends on getting regressive taxes off the table, because almost all of the arguments they make against progressivity, to the
extent they are persuasive, would more naturally lead to a highly
regressive tax structure than a degressive one. (It might also be
noted that once a regressive tax and a true fiat tax are off the
table, proponents of a degressive, rather than graduated, rate
structure have narrowed the choice to two alternatives that are so
close to each other in so many respects that it seems implausible
that the differences between them will be dispositive under most
theories of distributive justice.)
Blum & Kalven, supra note 6, at 419.
lo8 Taxation, supra note 5, at 68: "(I ignore here capitation taxes that call for all persons to pay a fixed amount of taxes, regardless of income.)."
lo9 Blum & Kalven, supra note 6, at 419.
'1o Id. at 420.
107
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We have lived with a progressive tax rate structure for so long
that we are all accustomed to think regressivity unthinkable. As
Thatcherite England makes clear, however, the unthinkable can
become thinkable. If it did here-if the political landscape
changed enough to make a regressive tax rate structure, or at the
extreme even a head tax, a politically plausible alternative-then
there is every reason to expect that the odd convergence on a flat
tax as "the fairest tax of all" would dissipate. Whatever Rawls
and other social welfarist participants in that convergence might
make of their inexplicable enthusiasm on second thought, one
would surely expect defection in the libertarian ranks. For libertarians, a regressive tax seems the more likely logical outcome of
their philosophical precommitments.

